Bridging the Uncanny:An impossible traverse? by Tinwell, Angela & Grimshaw, Mark Nicholas
 
  
 
Aalborg Universitet
Bridging the Uncanny
An impossible traverse?
Tinwell, Angela; Grimshaw, Mark Nicholas
Published in:
MindTrek
Publication date:
2009
Document Version
Early version, also known as pre-print
Link to publication from Aalborg University
Citation for published version (APA):
Tinwell, A., & Grimshaw, M. N. (2009). Bridging the Uncanny: An impossible traverse? In MindTrek: 13th
International Academic Conference http://www.mindtrek.org/2009/
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            ? Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            ? You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            ? You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at vbn@aub.aau.dk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from vbn.aau.dk on: November 30, 2020
University of Bolton
UBIR: University of Bolton Institutional Repository
Games Computing and Creative Technologies:
Conference Papers (Peer-Reviewed)
School of Games Computing and Creative
Technologies
2009
Bridging the Uncanny: An impossible traverse?
Angela Tinwell
University of Bolton, A.Tinwell@bolton.ac.uk
Mark Grimshaw
University of Bolton, m.n.grimshaw@bolton.ac.uk
This Conference Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Games Computing and Creative Technologies at UBIR: University
of Bolton Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Games Computing and Creative Technologies: Conference Papers (Peer-
Reviewed) by an authorized administrator of UBIR: University of Bolton Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact
ubir@bolton.ac.uk.
Digital Commons Citation
Tinwell, Angela and Grimshaw, Mark. "Bridging the Uncanny: An impossible traverse?." (2009). Games Computing and Creative
Technologies: Conference Papers (Peer-Reviewed). Paper 10.
http://digitalcommons.bolton.ac.uk/gcct_conferencepr/10
Bridging the Uncanny: An Impossible Traverse?
A.Tinwell 
Senior Lecturer 
The University of Bolton 
Deane Road, Bolton, BL3 5AB 
+44 (0)1204 903589 
A.Tinwell@bolton.ac.uk 
M.Grimshaw 
Reader in Creative Technologies 
The University of Bolton 
Deane Road, Bolton, BL3 5AB 
+44 (0)1204 903083 
M.N.Grimshaw@bolton.ac.uk
  
ABSTRACT 
This paper proposes that increasing technological sophistication 
in the creation of realism for human-like virtual characters is 
matched by increasing technological discernment on the part of 
the viewer. One of the goals for achieving a realism that is 
believable for virtual characters is to overcome the Uncanny 
Valley where perceived eeriness or familiarity are rated against 
perceived human-likeness. Empirical evidence shows the 
uncanny can be applied to virtual characters, yet implies a more 
complex picture than the shape of a deep valley with a sharp 
gradient   as   depicted   in   Mori’s   original   plot   of   the   Uncanny  
Valley. Our results imply that: (1) perceived familiarity is 
dependent upon a wider range of variables other than 
appearance and behaviour; and (2) for realistic, human-like 
characters, the Uncanny Valley is better replaced with the notion 
of an Uncanny Wall because the Uncanny Valley, as a concept, 
is not fully supported by the empirical evidence but, more 
importantly as a standard for creating human-like realism, is an 
impossible traverse. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
I.3 [Computer Graphics]: Three-Dimensional Graphics and 
Realism – animation, virtual reality; K.8 [Personal 
Computing]: General – games.  
General Terms 
Design, Human Factors, Theory. 
Keywords 
Uncanny Valley, video games, photo-realistic, characters.  
INTRODUCTION 
The   roboticist   Masahiro   Mori   observed   that   as   a   robot’s  
appearance becomes more human-like it is perceived as familiar 
to a viewer, until finer nuances from human norms caused them 
to appear eerie, evoking a negative effect for the viewer [25]. 
The positive relationship Mori identifies between the perceived 
familiarity for a robot with human-likeness is inverted at certain 
point where the robot is perceived as more strange than familiar. 
This sudden negative relationship occurs at the point where the 
robot appears close to being human and is referred to as the 
Uncanny Valley. Mori includes corpses, zombies and lifelike 
prosthetic hands as examples of things that lie in the Uncanny 
Valley and predicts that this phenomenon will be even more 
exaggerated with motion. Mori recommended that to avoid the 
risk of robots falling into the valley, designers should aspire to 
the first peak prior to the valley to achieving merely a humanoid 
appearance, as opposed to the second peak of a total human-
likeness.  
 Figure  1.  Mori’s  plot  of  perceived  familiarity  against  
human-likeness as the Uncanny Valley taken from a 
translation by Karl MacDorman and Takashi Minato  of 
Mori’s The Uncanny Valley [25]. 
Since  Mori’s  original  theory  of  the  Uncanny  Valley  in  1970,  the  
concept seems to have remained suspended for nearly 30 years, 
but has recently reemerged as increasing sophistication in 
technology allows for increasing realism for both androids and 
virtual characters [18] [29]. Despite being recognized as a 
phenomenon that is not only restricted to human-like robots [30] 
the majority of explanations for the uncanny, with regards to 
virtual characters, remain untested [4] [18] [29]. Studies that 
have been carried out since for virtual characters have included 
the use of still images as stimuli and state that the findings from 
their studies may not apply to animated faces or bodies thus 
providing the opportunity to further investigate how motion and 
sound may exaggerate the uncanny [9] [19] [31] [32]. By 
implementing unused data from a previous empirical study using 
videos of virtual characters we attempt to plot the uncanny for 
such characters [36]. Based on the findings from our study, this 
paper proposes the theory that, instead of an Uncanny Valley, 
designers of realistic, human-like characters are faced with an 
Uncanny  Wall,   created   by   the   viewers’   continually   improving  
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discernment of the   technical   trickery   used   in   the   character’s  
creation and this discernment prevents complete believability in 
the human-likeness of that character. 
For   the   purposes   of   this   paper,   the   term   “realism”   is   used   to  
describe attributes for a character where the designer has 
intended that it be perceived as realistically human-like and this 
covers aspects of, and relationships between, appearance, 
motion, behaviour, sound and, in some cases, context. As some 
video game developers pursue realism in an attempt to bridge 
the Uncanny Valley for human-like characters in video games, it 
can sometimes seem that the more human-like characters 
become, the more vociferously potential users will object [8]. As 
users become acclimatized to the current level of technological 
achievements in approximating realism, it seems users have 
developed a heightened level of awareness for the attributes that 
make a character appear lifeless as opposed to lifelike. For a 
virtual character, the more that character is intended to be 
realistic, the less forgiving the viewer is when identifying a 
difference or strangeness for that character; symptomatic of the 
uncanny sensation within the context that Freud described for 
distinguishing between human and non human-like forms  [7]. 
The empirical data collected for our study provided evidence to 
suggest that realistic human-like characters, proclaimed as 
overcoming the Uncanny Valley [27], were actually rated as less 
familiar than a human; implying that they have not yet 
accomplished this feat. We put forward the idea that increased 
habituation with the technology used in the attempt to create 
realistic human-like characters only serves to prompt viewers of 
differences from the human norm. Accordingly, we propose the 
Uncanny Wall may never be climbed as the viewer becomes 
ever more discerning of the use of this technology. 
The Uncanny Sensation 
A number of authors have discussed the uncanny as it relates to 
perceptions of a range of artificial character types.  As Minato et 
al. suggest, the uncanny sensation may not be in response to a 
single phenomenon, but instead various factors influence how 
human-likeness is perceived for both appearance and behaviour 
[24]. They found that on interaction with an android, the 
uncanny was particularly strong for pre-school children aged 
between three and five years old, that the uncanny would be 
stronger for children, as opposed to adults, and that habituation 
would also lead to a change both in interaction with and 
perception of the android. Bartnek et al. relate the uncanny as a 
consequence of a framing effect where, on encountering an 
android,   the   expectations   raised   from   selecting   our   “human-
frame”  fall  short  of  the  data  structure  that  we  have  stored  for  this  
particular frame [3].  The authors suggested that whilst results 
showed that the framing effect had little impact on the 
perception of still pictures of robots, the results may differ for 
the perception of moving robots (for our study, videos were used 
for all stimuli). Ramey suggests that the uncanny is caused by an 
overlap   of   two   otherwise   separate   categories   (‘human’   and  
‘robot’)   and   it   challenges   the   intuition   of   one’s   individual  
identity   or   one’s   humanity,   creating   a   paradox   for   the   features  
that  justify  one’s  existence  as  human  [30].  This  idea  of  conflict 
or paradox as the root of the uncanny bears similarities to 
Plantec’s  use  of  the  theory  of  cognitive  dissonance  to  explain  the  
uncanny [28]. When confronted with a realistic human-like 
character, a viewer is prevented from believing that it is real as 
contradictory beliefs occur to identify flaws and to stop the 
viewer from being tricked.  
The eerie sensation elicited by uncanny robots has been 
associated with reminding viewers of their own mortality [21] 
[25].   Building   on   Rozin’s   Theory of Disgust, (humans 
instinctively protect themselves from the potential threat of 
infection) and suggesting that perceived eeriness may be a 
manifestation   of   one’s   own   defence   mechanisms   [31],  
MacDorman conducted an empirical study, using methods of 
terror management research, to investigate whether uncanny 
robots elicit a fear of death [21].  Whilst the results from the 
study were favourable to this hypothesis, MacDorman also 
suggests that other factors may still contribute to the uncanny 
such   as   “expectations   elicited   by   the   human   form”.   Ho   et   al.  
identified that the emotion term fear has also been identified as a 
strong predictor of the uncanny sensation for robots [12]. Based 
on the results of a previous empirical study, Tinwell also 
identified that fear can be associated not only with virtual 
characters intended to contest a sense of the real such as 
zombies, but also uncanny protagonist characters who may not 
have been intended to evoke such a negative reaction [37], for 
example, Mary Smith by Quantic Dream [35]. These findings 
imply that the initial wow factor reaction that realistic human-
like characters can receive, such as the Emily Project [6], may 
be replaced with a potential fear factor as an underlying 
sensation of discontent grows for the character. Thus, realistic 
human-like characters intended to be used as protagonists within 
a game may risk evoking a negative emotional state for the 
viewer when this was not the intent. 
Traversing the Valley 
Attempts to increase realism within the areas of robotics and 
virtual characters raises the question: is it possible to overcome 
the Uncanny Valley? Brenton et al. suggest that for virtual 
characters,   a   viewer’s   response   is   likely   to   change   over   time;;  
characters will appear less uncanny as viewers grow accustomed 
to them [4].  Using  the  example  of  Duane  Hanson’s  The Jogger, 
Brenton  et  al.  state  that  the  sculpture  appears,  “less  uncanny  the  
second time that it is viewed because you are expecting it and 
have pre-classified   it   as   a  dead  object”.  They   also   suggest   that  
those involved in the development of realistic human-like 
characters, or those with a high level of exposure to realistic 
human-like characters (for example, an advanced experience of 
playing video games or using 3D modeling software), would be 
even more accustomed to, and less likely to detect uncanniness 
from interacting with this type of character. Hanson claims that, 
whilst very abstract robots or cosmetically peculiar people can 
be uncanny, it is possible to design against the uncanny for 
androids [11]. The findings   from   Hanson’s   study   show   that  
making adjustments to still images of androids across a 
spectrum of human-likeness, to make androids features more 
“friendly   and   attractive”,   can   result   in   the   uncanny   being  
removed from results where it was previously evident. Whilst 
Hanson notes that the Uncanny Valley is not preordained, the 
changes Hanson applied to the morphs involved cartoonish, 
stylized features, as opposed to realistic human-like features.1 
As we explain below, we believe that a traversal of the Uncanny 
Valley is impossible because of increasing sophistication on the 
part of the viewer and that the concept of uncanniness for virtual 
characters is better viewed as an Uncanny Wall. 
                                                                
1  This  is  merely  an  oblique  validation  of  Mori’s  theory. 
METHODOLOGY 
Our methodology comprises an empirical study using virtual 
characters and the collection of qualitative data to investigate if 
the uncanny can be applied to virtual characters, and if so, which 
factors  contribute  to  the  uncanny.  In  response  to  Mori’s  interest  
in how motion would impact perception (the valley would be 
even more exaggerated with moving characters) [25], it has been 
suggested that for recent empirical studies where still images of 
robots or virtual characters have been used as stimuli, the results 
might have produced a different outcome had moving images 
been used as stimuli instead [3] [11] [19] [32]. Our study 
develops this suggestion by using video clips of virtual 
characters as the experimental stimuli.  
100 participants were used with 92 males and eight females. The 
participants were mainly university students from the School of 
Games Computing and Creative Technologies (GCCT) at 
Bolton University in addition to professionals working within 
the academic sector and video games industry. Students were 
selected from the Computer Games Design, Computer Games 
Software Development and Computer Games Art courses. 
Participants were presented with 14 video clips of a selection of 
virtual characters and one video clip of a real human placed in 
different settings and engaged in different activities (Table 1). 
The video clips comprised: six photo-realistic characters; (1) the 
Emily Project [6], (2) and the Warrior by Image Metrics [39]; 
(3)  Mary  Smith   from  Quantic  Dream’s   tech  demo  The Casting 
[35]; (4) Alex Shepherd from Silent Hill Homecoming [34] and 
two avatars (5) Louis and (6) Francis from Left 4 Dead [16]; five 
zombie characters, (7) a Smoker, (8) The Infected, (9) The Tank 
and (10) The Witch from Left 4 Dead [16], (11) a photo-realistic 
human-like zombie (Zombie 1) from the video game Alone in 
the Dark [1]; three stylised human-like characters including (12) 
a  Chatbot   character   “Lillien”,   [17],   (13)  Lara  Croft   from  Lara 
Croft Tomb Raider: The Action Adventure [14] and (14) Mario 
from Mario and Sonic at the Olympic Games [22]; and (15) one 
real human. 
 
Figure 2. The 15 characters used in the experiment, as listed 
in Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. The 15 characters used in the experiment, as shown 
in Figure 2. 
 Name  Name  Name 
1 Emily 6 Francis 11 Zombie 1 
2 Warrior 7 A Smoker 12 Chatbot 
3 Mary Smith 8 The Tank 13 Lara Croft 
4 Alex Shepherd 9 
The 
Infected 14 Mario 
5 Louis 10 The Witch 15 Human 
 
The participants were asked through a web-based questionnaire 
to rate on a nine-point scale how human-like they perceived the 
character to be from nonhuman-like (1) to very human-like (9). 
To measure the perceived eeriness for a character, participants 
were asked to rate how strange (eerie) or familiar2 they 
perceived the character to be from very strange (1) to very 
familiar (9).  To measure how behaviour affects perceived 
familiarity for a character, participants were asked to rate if they 
agreed   with   the   statement:      “Based   on   the   character's  
appearance, this character behaves in a way that I would expect 
them   to”   from   Strongly Disagree (1) to Strongly Agree (9).  
Participants were also asked to rate their level of experience 
both playing video games and of using 3D modelling software 
from the options, None, Basic or Advanced. The video clips 
were played in random order to each participant. 
                                                                
2 The appropriateness of familiarity both as a term and as a 
dependent variable to measure uncanniness has been 
addressed by previous authors such as MacDorman [20]. 
Familiarity can be open to a range of interpretations from 
participants. Whilst strange is a typical term for describing the 
unfamiliar, familiarity might be interpreted with a variety of 
meanings including how well-known an object appears (that 
is, it might be a well-known character in popular culture). For 
this study, it was explained to participants that familiarity 
described objects that did not appear eerie or odd, as opposed 
to whether an object was well-known. 
RESULTS 
 
Figure 3. Mean ratings for how human-like a character is 
perceived to be against mean ratings for perceived 
familiarity. 
Figure 3 plots the mean ratings for how human-like  a  character’s  
general appearance or behaviour is perceived to be against 
perceived familiarity and reveals more than one single valley in 
the  plot.  The  mean  rating   for  familiarity  was  5.16  (σ  2.16)  and  
the mean rating for human-likeness  was  5.75  (σ  2.11). 
Table 2. Mean values for perceived familiarity and perceived 
human-likeness for participants with differing levels of 
experience using 3D modelling software. 
Experience 
of 3D 
Modelling 
Software 
Number of 
Participants 
Perceived 
Familiarity 
(mean 5.14, 
σ  0.06) 
Perceived 
Human-
Likeness 
(mean 5.77, 
σ  0.09) 
None 13 5.05 5.9 
Basic 64 5.16 5.7 
Advanced 23 5.2 5.7 
Table 3. Mean values for perceived familiarity and perceived 
human-likeness for participants with differing levels of 
experience playing video games software. 
Experience 
of Playing 
Video 
Games 
Number of 
Participants 
Perceived 
Familiarity 
(mean 5.17, 
σ  0.06) 
Perceived 
Human-
Likeness 
(mean 5.49, 
σ  0.3) 
None 3 5.11 5.4 
Basic 14 5.25 5.9 
Advanced 83 5.14 5.17 
 
Table 4. Mean values of ratings for perceived familiarity, 
human-likeness and expected behaviour based on a 
character’s  appearance. 
Character 
Familiarity 
(mean 5.16, 
σ  2.16) 
Human-
Likeness 
(mean 5.75, 
σ  2.11) 
Behaviour 
(mean 6.79, 
σ  0.95) 
1 7.25 8.67 8.17 
2 4.53 6.63 6.18 
3 2.99 3.23 4.25 
4 3 5.24 6.09 
5 6.38 6.84 6.68 
6 5.23 7.68 6 
7 3.21 4.19 6.64 
8 2.33 2.39 6.88 
9 2.4 3.28 6.89 
10 3.1 4.43 6.84 
11 7.02 7.27 7.15 
12 6.8 7.34 7.54 
13 8.26 8.8 8.44 
14 7.36 6.69 6.92 
15 7.48 3.5 7.15 
 
When participants were grouped together under different levels 
of experience (None, Basic and Advanced,) for using 3D 
modelling software (see Table 2) and playing video games (see 
Table 3) the results show no significant difference for perceived 
familiarity and human-likeness for each group.  
Table 4 shows the mean ratings for perceived familiarity (mean 
5.16,   σ   2.16)   and   human-likeness   (5.75,   σ   2.11)   for   each  
character, with mean ratings for expected behaviour based on 
the  character’s  appearance.    The  Pearson  correlation  coefficient  
between perceived familiarity and behaviour was r=0.6. The 
results   show   only   “a   moderate/marked   degree   of   correlation”,  
(by   Pearson’s   definition)   which   implies   perceived   behaviour  
may have a less significant impact on perceived familiarity, or 
how uncanny a character is perceived to be, than previously 
suggested [2] [4] [23] [24] [29] [38]. For perceived human-
likeness, the results show that the expectation for behaviour is 
even  less  significant  (r=0.49).  This  correlation  stands  for  just  “a  
moderate degree of correlation”  by  Pearson’s  definition.   
DISCUSSION 
Attempts to find an empirical basis for the visual representation 
of the Uncanny Valley chart risk taking the graphical metaphor 
too   literally.      Mori’s   theory   places   the   pit   of   the   valley   at   an  
apparently arbitrary 80-85% on the human-likeness scale 
(Figure  1).    Furthermore,  this  graphical  representation  of  Mori’s  
theory is very neat and pat, displaying a single valley with 
smooth inclines.  Empirical evidence indicates a more complex 
picture that seems to be dependent upon more variables than 
Mori’s   original   parameters   of   appearance   and  movement.      For  
example,  MacDorman’s  findings  show  the  nadir  of  the  valley  at  
approximately 35-40% on the human-likeness scale (about 3.5 
on a scale of 1-9) when participants were asked to rate the 
familiarity of a series of still images displaying the visual 
morphing of a mechanical looking robot into a human [20].  
(The  participants’  ratings  for  eeriness  of  the  characters  depicted  
in the images shows a clear inverse correlation with familiarity 
providing evidence for the accepted equation between eeriness – 
and related negative emotions such as fear and apprehension – 
and uncanniness.)  While showing a valley-like dip similar to 
Mori’s   Uncanny   Valley,   the   noticeable   difference   in  
MacDorman’s   empirically-based graphs is the position of the 
valley’s  pit  at  around  35-40%  rather  than  Mori’s  theoretical  80-
85%.     Furthermore,   the   gradients   out   of  MacDorman’s   valleys  
are  more  gentle  than  Mori’s  almost  perpendicular  gradient.    The  
implication (for still images) is that not only does the degree of 
human- likeness need to be far less than Mori predicted for an 
eerie and uncanny sensation to occur but also that feelings of 
eeriness and uncanniness can be associated to a far wider 
latitude in human-likeness than the very narrow range (at very 
close to human-like) that Mori predicted. 
When MacDorman brought movement into the empirical 
equation (with a series of videos of robots ranging from 
mechanical to human-like), two important results were 
uncovered.  Firstly, graphical plots of mean ratings of familiarity 
against human-likeness showed no single valley and certainly no 
valleys of the depth and gradient that Mori suggested.  Secondly, 
notwithstanding a typographical inconsistency in the 
presentation of the results, median familiarity ratings 
demonstrate that, in this experiment, robots judged as having the 
same degree of human-likeness can have a different assessment 
of their familiarity.  This difference is more marked when 
comparing assessments of human-likeness for robots judged to 
have the same median rating of familiarity.  The lack of any 
single  valley  or,   indeed,   any   significant   valley,  when   a   robot’s  
appearance is combined with movement is prima facie evidence 
against   Mori’s   Uncanny   Valley   theory – or at least evidence 
against the construct of a single valley with increased depth and 
gradient as character movement is assessed. 
The later experiment of Tinwell and Grimshaw described in this 
paper and elsewhere confirms the complexity and lack of clarity 
of the Uncanny Valley theory when subjected to empirical 
evidence [36].  Here, the same 9-point scales of familiarity and 
human-likeness as MacDorman uses were applied to a 100-
sample assessment of 15 characters in videos ranging from 
digital animation to human.  Again, there was no single valley to 
be found (as demonstrated by Table 3).  However, there was one 
significant valley bounded by the anthropomorphic cartoon of 
Mario on the left and the photo-realistic Lara Croft character on 
the right with the nadir centred around 50-55% human-likeness 
(once   more,   lower   than   Mori’s   prediction   of   80-85%).  One 
important  difference  between  this  experiment  and  MacDorman’s  
experiment was the deliberate inclusion of character 
vocalization as part of the assessment process in addition to 
appearance   and  movement   (only   some   of  MacDorman’s   video  
examples included speech).  In attempting to find empirical 
evidence   for   Mori’s   Uncanny   Valley   theory,   the  
inconclusiveness  of   these   sets   of   results   support  MacDorman’s  
suggestion that factors beyond human-likeness (when 
interpreting how a character looks) contribute to sensations of 
eeriness and the uncanny. 
MacDorman provides movement as one of these factors but 
points out that the empirical evidence from experiments 
including   this   factor   are   inconsistent   with   Mori’s   Uncanny  
Valley.  The inclusion of character vocalizations is potentially 
another factor.  In our experiment, we found strong correlations 
between perceptions of increasing character eeriness and 
uncanniness with lack of lip and sound synchronization, with 
lack of human-likeness of the voice and with increasing 
exaggeration of mouth articulation while vocalizing [36].  As a 
factor that might be implicated in the uncanny and its associated 
perceptions and emotions, in addition to the above work there is 
a small body of work analyzing the effect of various sonic 
parameters on emotional states.  Works such as that of Edworthy 
et al. suggest that parameters of sound creating perceptions of 
movement of the sound source towards the listener increase 
perceptions of urgency in that listener [5]; Halpern et al. suggest 
that the likeness of the sound of fingernails scraping across a 
blackboard to predator sounds or the warning cries of primates is 
what leads to the nerve-jarring unpleasantness of such a sound 
(implicit to such a suggestion, in the absence of typical modern 
human inexperience of such sounds, is a vestigial, primeval 
collective cognizance of such environmentally illuminating 
sounds) [10]; and Owren and Bachorowski suggest that primates 
deliberately manipulate fundamental parameters of their 
vocalizations in order to directly or indirectly affect their 
listener’s   emotions   (rather   than   such   sounds   having   a  
representational meaning understood linguistically) offering the 
conjecture that this is how some human vocalizations work (for 
example,  laughter  and  a  baby’s  cry)  [26]. 
Assessing expected behaviour according to appearance, (the 
uncanny was exaggerated for a viewer when the character failed 
to behave in the expected manner), our findings go against 
popular belief [2] [4] [23] [24] [29] [38].  Our results show only 
a moderate degree of correlation for the relationship between 
perceived familiarity and behaviour (r=0.6) with the relationship 
between perceived human-likeness and behaviour of even less 
significance (r=0.49). A stronger relationship between these 
variables might have been achieved if participants had been 
asked   to  observe   a  particular   aspect   of   a   character’s  behaviour  
(for example, lip movement or facial expression in the upper 
part of the face) instead of overall behaviour vis-a-vis 
appearance. Participants might be more sensitive to such overall 
behaviour based on appearance when interacting on a one-to-one 
basis with an android [24] rather than watching a virtual 
character onscreen, which may be regarded as a more passive 
form of interaction. Further studies are planned to investigate 
how   individual   aspects   of   a   character’s   behaviour   may  
exaggerate the uncanny.  
There may well be other factors involved in the Uncanny Valley 
beyond appearance, movement and sound.  As Ho et al. state, 
“the   uncanny   valley   may   not   be   a   single   phenomenon   to   be  
explained by a single theory but rather a nexus of phenomena 
with   disparate   causes”   [12].      Furthermore,   it   seems   to be the 
case that, rather than working independently to create an 
uncanny sensation, some, if not all, factors, work together.  As 
an example, Tinwell and Grimshaw found that lack of lip-
vocalization synchronization increased the uncanny 
phenomenon – this is a combination of movement and sound – 
but they also found high correlations between familiarity and 
human-likeness  of  the  characters’  voice  and  between  familiarity  
and the judgement that the voice belonged to the character [36].  
In this last case, the combining factors are at least sound and 
appearance. 
This last assessment (of the voice belonging to the character or 
not) points to the role of experience as another factor.  There is 
an expectation, based on experience, that, for example, large 
objects will produce a low frequency sound and vice-versa 
(think elephants compared to mice or the length and thickness of 
piano strings), that wooden objects will produce a duller sound 
than metallic objects and that the sound of an approaching object 
will intensify.  What is interesting here is that participants, 
presented with similar-sized, 2-dimensional video 
representations of a range of characters, were able to assess the 
appropriateness and fit of the voice to the character.  This idea 
of appropriateness of the visual and audio modes to each other 
may   be   compared   to  Laurel’s   suggestion   that   the   resolution   of  
the  modes  should  match  otherwise  the  artefact  will  seem  “brain-
damaged”   [15].      The   concept   of   cross-modally matching 
resolutions is not necessarily limited to the comparative quality 
of audio and video but can also be applied to other relationships 
as detailed above – a mouse squeak synchronized to an elephant 
can, depending on yet further factors, be absurd, comical or just 
plain wrong. 
The human-like stylized characters, Mario and Lara Croft, are 
widely recognized as icons within the gaming industry, which 
may have affected how participants rated them on the familiarity 
versus strangeness scale. Despite being instructed to rate 
perceived familiarity in regards to how human-like a character is 
perceived to be, these characters might have been a limitation 
within the study with participants more likely to rate them as 
familiar because of how well-known these characters are. A 
further study including human-like stylized characters that are 
not so easily recognizable might improve the experimental 
validity of the study. 
A lack of anthropomorphic type characters within the study has 
served as another limitation. Characters with a clearly non-
human-like appearance but exhibiting human-like traits, 
according   to  Mori’s   theory,   are   likely   to   be   placed   before   the  
first peak in the uncanny plot and not in the valley due to a more 
simplistic, humanoid appearance. Including a wider range of 
anthropomorphic type characters, as well as realistic, human-
like characters, is also planned for further study. 
Putting the Uncanny into Context 
One important factor governing the appropriateness of this 
resolution matching is context.  As explained above, in one 
context such juxtapositions when ill-fitting can lead to feelings 
associated with the uncanny, in another context, they are absurd 
and potentially comical.  For example, intentionally badly 
dubbed Chock-Socky movies or the absurd yet funny sound FX 
used   in   Jacques   Tati’s  movies or a host of animated cartoons.  
This points to the importance of context as a governing force 
subconsciously providing direction as to how to emotionally 
react to sensation.  Context is the frame within which responses 
are formed (cf Framing Theory).  Watching Young Frankenstein 
[40], for example, audiences are likely to laugh rather than 
scream not solely because of the antics of the monster but also 
because of the prior knowledge that the film is a comedy (as 
indicated by posters, reviews, previous experience  of   the   stars’  
other work and so on).  This notion of avoidance of the uncanny 
through a framing context is complemented by Plantec who uses 
the theory of cognitive dissonance to explain why cartoon 
characters in particular do not lead to sensations of the uncanny 
[28].  Because cartoons do not attempt to deceive or trick the 
audience into believing they are real humans, there is no 
cognitive dissonance and, therefore no feeling of unease.  Where 
character creators attempt to fool the audience that the artefact is 
indeed human, there lies the risk of cognitive dissonance; 
audiences   find   subtle   inconsistencies   in   the   character’s  
representation that then militate against the plea to believe in the 
humanness of the character.  Such cognitive dissonance, the 
inability to square the belief that the character is human with the 
apprehension of inhuman imperfections in its rendering, is a 
potential explanation of the Uncanny Valley as Plantec points 
out.      This   is   similar   to   Brenton   et   al.’s   use   of   Gestalt-like 
theories of presence to explain the Uncanny Valley [4].  The 
authors describe the theory that virtual reality users make use of 
two hypotheses; one relating to presence in the virtual world and 
one relating to presence in reality.  A switch between hypotheses 
or the dominance of one over the other (the foregrounding of 
that hypothesis) leads to a break in presence (from virtual to 
reality or vice-versa) and, the authors suggest, this is the cause 
of the Uncanny Valley.  The flaw in this theory is exemplified 
by the first-person horror genre of computer games – 
presumably, the uncanny is to be desired simultaneously with 
presence in the game world.  However, it would be possible to 
modify the theory through the inclusion of further hypotheses 
and one of these would be the contextual framing hypothesis 
(this is a horror game and I expect to be frightened at the same 
time as being immersed in the game).  This framing hypothesis 
acts as a governor, foregrounding other hypotheses such that 
uncanniness is allowed to occur without the break in presence.  
It is a quantum-like state of cognitive dissonance-consonance. 
The Effect of Habituation 
The   results   of   this   study   imply   that   a   viewer’s   level   of  
experience in interacting with realistic, human-like, characters 
does not have a significant impact for how uncanny a character 
is perceived to be. Viewers with an advanced level of experience 
using 3D modeling software or with an advanced experience of 
playing video games, showed only a marginal difference in 
mean values for perceived familiarity and perceived human-
likeness against the overall mean values for perceived 
familiarity  5.16   (σ  2.16)  and  perceived  human-likeness  5.75   (σ  
2.11) for the 15 stimuli within this study (see Tables 2 and 3). 
This disputes Brenton et al.’s   theory   that   those   exposed   to   a  
greater level of interaction with realistic human-like characters 
may be less aware of uncanny traits [4]. Instead we propose that 
a generally increasing level of technological discernment on the 
part of viewers (perhaps at a societal-cultural level) maintains 
the uncanny; successive developments in the pursuit of realism 
merely raise the bar of discernment.  This discernment relates to 
the technology used rather than to habituation through use or 
exposure to any one character. 
Minato et al. suggested that the habituation effect may alter a 
participant’s   interaction  with   an   android,   yet   notes   that   further  
experiments would be required to test if a participant would 
become more accepting of an android [24]. We propose that the 
relationship between perceived acceptance and perceived 
familiarity would not be significant in reducing uncanniness 
over time. If the character was perceived as uncanny on first 
contact,  a  character’s  believability  is  unlikely  to  increase  beyond  
that of a human, no matter how accustomed to it one becomes. 
Familiarity may increase slightly as acceptance grows, but this 
increase would not reduce uncanniness significantly and may 
also only be for a temporary period. The flaws that a viewer may 
have grown to tolerate over time will be exaggerated yet again 
as soon as the next technological breakthrough for increasing 
realism is developed, hence reducing the overall perceived 
acceptance of a character. A viewer is reminded of the flaws in a 
character, thus decreasing perceived familiarity (Figure 4). 
CONCLUSION 
The ameliorating effect exerted by the framing hypothesis may 
help explain why the empirical evidence presents a more dirty 
picture   of   the   Uncanny   Valley   than   Mori’s   clean-cut image.  
Perhaps it is an explanation as to why the depths of the multiple 
uncanny valleys indicated by the experiments are not as deep as 
the one envisioned by Mori.  Context, with sound and other 
factors, may now be added to appearance and movement as 
factors influencing perceptions of the Uncanny Valley and the 
greater number of potential outcomes arising out of having more 
parameters to assess, in addition to the interplay between them, 
is  a  likely  explanation  for  the  inconsistency  with  Mori’s  theory.    
Certainly, it seems clear that the Uncanny Valley, as Mori 
envisioned it, does not exist.  Rather, it is more useful to think of 
it as a concept and a spur to developers; the impetus behind a 
form of Uncanny Turing test (similar testing techniques have 
already been used for androids [13]).  Which brings us to the 
question:  can the Uncanny Valley be traversed?  We suggest 
the answer is no; rather than Uncanny Valley, we suggest 
Uncanny Wall (Figure 4).  Furthermore, this wall gets higher 
because of one other factor that other writers have included as 
an element of habituation.  This factor is time.  However, 
whereas Brenton et al. (and others) suggest that audiences, over 
time, become used to and accommodate factors that once led to 
the uncanny [4], we suggest that time leads to an increasing 
discernment on the part of viewers to technical trickery.  This 
increasing sophistication of discernment is the reason why the 
wall rises as time passes and it may well be that this discernment 
is at a societal-cultural level rather than being an individual 
response.      In   2007,   Plantec   suggested   “two   more   years   with  
luck”   for  an  artificial  human  character   to  cross   the  Valley   [28]  
and, in 2008, hailed the Emily character (which was used as one 
of the videos in our experiment) as having achieved that [27].  
Yet, the experiment we describe here shows that character 
judged consistently as less familiar than the video of a human 
being.  While the difference was slight, we intend to re-run the 
experiment with the inclusion of the next-generation of virtual 
human as it is released.  If our theory of the Uncanny Wall is 
correct, we expect the familiarity difference between Emily and 
human to increase because the participants will have become 
more discerning in their assessment and therefore more able to 
recognize the technical trickery that attempts to persuade of the 
humanness of the character. 
 
Figure 4. The Uncanny Wall. 
Accordingly we present the theory of the Uncanny Wall 
(represented in Figure 4) as: 
technological discernment on the part of the audience 
generally keeps pace with technological developments 
used in the attempt to create realistic human-like 
characters such that, ultimately, the perception of 
uncanniness for such characters is inevitable. 
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